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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIE E. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
\VESTERN CASUALTY AND 
SURETY COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
10,524 
Plaintiff's Complaint ( R. 1-2) sets out two 
causes of action against the defendant. The first 
cause of action was in the nature of a garnishment 
action whereby the plaintiff sought to recover from 
the defendant the policy amount ($10,000.00) on 
the Judgment awarded to the plaintiff in a pre-
vious action against the defendant's policyholder, 
Chuck Shim Lew. The second cause of action was 
in the nature of a tort action whereby the plain-
tiff sought to recover from the defendant an addi-
tional $2,500.00 over the policy limits, claiming 
that the defendant was guilty of bad faith in only 
offering the sum of $6,000.00 to settle the plain-
tiff's claim. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On Cross Motions For Summary Judgment 
made at the time of the pre-trial of this action, the 
trial court granted plaintiff's Motion as to the first 
cause of action and dismissed the plaintiff's second 
cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and appellant seeks a reversal of 
the summary judgment granted to the plaintiff on 
her first cause of action and seeks entry of a sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant and appel-
lant. In the event this court sees fit to affirm the 
holding of the trial court, defendant and appellant 
seeks a modification of the judgment entered in 
favor of the plaintiff and respondent to eliminate 
or correct the interest awarded to the plaintiff by 
said judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record in this case consists of the plead-
ings, Motions, Order and Judgment filed in this 
action, the pleadings, Motions, Orders and J udg-
ments in the action brought by Marie E. Peterson 
against Chuck Shim Lew, Civil No. 143,286 in the 
District. Court of Salt Lake County and a number 
of Exhibits, including two depositions (Exhibits 
D-10 and D-11). The facts, as established by the 
pleadings and Exhibits contained in the record be-
fore this court, are the following: 
On February 24, 1963 at approximately 2 :23 
2 
o'clock A.M. the plaintiff was riding as a guest 
in a car driven by Dennis H. McMillan, which car 
collided with a vehicle driven by the defendant's 
insured, Chuck Shim Lew. The collision occurred 
in the intersection of 900 East and 2700 South in 
Salt Lake City, which intersection is protected by 
a traffic semaphore showing green, yellow and red. 
The right front portion of McMillan's car collided 
with the left front door area of Chuck Shim Lew's 
vehicle (D-11, page 13). McMillan said the light 
was green in his favor as he approached, but that 
it turned to amber as he was in the intersection 
(D-11, page 15). Mr. Lew testified at a subsequent 
hearing in regard to a citation issued to McMillan 
that he (Lew) had the green light and that Mc-
Millan had gone through a red light (D-11, page 
22). No eye witnesses were known (D-10, page 19) 
except the two drivers and the plaintiff, Marie E. 
Peterson. 
Suit was filed on May 23, 1963 by plaintiff 
against Chuck Shim Lew. In the Answer to the 
Complaint filed on his behalf by the insurer, Wes-
tern Casualty And Sm·ety Company (hereinafter 
ref erred to as Wes tern), Chuck Shim Lew denied 
any negligence or misconduct and alleged as an 
affirmative defense that plaintiff could not recover 
against defendant because the negligence of McMil-
lan was the sole proximate cause of the accident 
and the resulting injuries, if any, which she sus-
tained. 
3 
On July 25, 1963 counsel for Western mailed 
a letter (Ex. D-3) to Lew at his Salt Lake City 
address of 838 Jefferson Street, notifying him of its 
entrance into the case and advising him to notify 
Western or counsel of any change of address he 
might make since it may be necessary to contact 
him on short notice. The letter was returned, un-
delivered. 
On August 19, 1963 counsel mailed a request 
to Western and an independent adjuster for assist-
ance in locating Mr. Lew. Counsel was advised 
orally that Lew was residing at 301 Boyle Avenue, 
Los Angeles, California (Ex. D-2, pp 2-3). Pursu-
ant to this information counsel wrote a letter (Ex. 
D-4) on September 6, 1963 informing Lew that a 
complaint had been filed against him asking 
$32,154.95 in damages. In the letter he was request-
ed to keep counsel advised of his whereabouts, and 
to inform them of any change of address since it 
may be necessary to contact him on short notice 
(Ex. D-5). 
Mr. Lew replied by letter on September 19, 
1963 in which he said: 
~'Dear Mr. Hanson, 
"I had receive your carbon copy yester-
day, and I wish to thank you for notifying 
me. 
"At the present, I am working in River-
side, California. I wish to know if I have to 
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appear in court with you and the date to 
appear in court. 
"My present address is % Chungking 
Rest., 3817 Market St., Riverside, California. 
The telephone number is Ov-6-7292. You could 
notify me at this address. 
"Again, I wish to express my thanks to 
you. 
"Truly Yours, 
"Chuck Shim Lew" 
In reply to this letter counsel on September 23, 1963 
wrote to Mr. Lew: 
"We are in l'eceipt of your letter of Sep-
tember 19, 1963. We will advise you when it 
is necessary for you to appear in court or of 
any other action which you might be required 
to take in connection with this case. Kindly 
keep us advised of your whereabouts so that 
we might either write you or telephone you 
on short notice." (Ex. D-6) 
This letter was never returned and is thus pre-
sumed to have been delivered. 
On February 4, 1964 the case was set for trial 
on March 12, 1964. In a letter dated February 7, 
1964 counsel wrote to Lew at the California address 
given by Lew, advising him of the trial setting and 
asking that he be in Salt Lake City not later than 
March 12, 1964. A copy of that letter was sent to 
Lew's Salt Lake address. The letter sent to Calif-
ornia was returned with a notation indicating that 
Lew no longer lived at that address. 
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Upon return of that letter counsel once again 
contacted \Vestern for assistance. \Vestern refened 
counsel to Mr. Herbert C. Papenfuss, an agent for 
Monarch Underwriters who had sold Mr. Lew his 
policy and also loaned him money. Counsel was in-
formed that Mr. Papenfuss had made an investiga-
tion by going to California in October of 1963 to 
try to locate this defendant. He interviewed various 
people in several restaurants, by whom he was in-
formed that Lew had left California and had prob-
ably gone to Vancouver, Canada. He learned noth-
ing more until January, 1964 when he received a 
remittance from Lew who gave his address as Club 
13 Cafe, Bienfait, Saskatchewan, Canada. He tele-
phoned the Club 13, but was told that Lew had left 
and might be in Florida, either in Miami or Miami 
Beach. 
Upon the basis of the information received 
from Papenfuss counsel moved the court on March 
4, 1964 for a continuance of the trial of the action 
brought by Marie E. Peterson against Chuck Shim 
Lew in order that additional efforts could be made 
to locate Lew in Florida. The motion was resisted 
by the plaintiff, Marie E. Peterson, and was heard 
and denied on March 6, 1964. On that same day 
counsel. filed an Offer Of Judgment for $6,000.00, 
the amount he had previously offered plaintiff's 
counsel verbally, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. He also mailed a letter 
(Ex. D-8) to Lew notifying him of counsel's with-
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drawal and the denial of coverage due to his non-
cooperation. Copies of that letter were sent to Lew's 
former address in Salt Lake City; Riverside, Calif-
ornia; and Bienfait, Saskatchewan. All were return-
ed, undelivered. On March 10, 1964 counsel filed 
Notice of Withdrawal and Notice To Appoint Other 
Counsel (Ex. D-9) and copies of these were mailed 
to the above mentioned addresses. Again they were 
returned, undelivered. 
The case proceeded to trial with the plaintiff 
recovering a default Judgment against Chuck Shim 
Lew for $12,500.00. 
On March 4, 1965 the present action was insti-
tuted against Western. Plaintiff alleged two causes 
of action. In the first cause of action she sought 
to recover the $10,000.00 policy limits. In the second 
she prayed for $2,500.00 on the ground that Wes-
tern acted in bad faith in not settling the action 
within the policy limits (R. 1-4). 
The cause came up for pre-trial and the hear-
ing of Motions by both parties for summary judg-
ment before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson on 
October 7, 1965 (R. 40). The defendant, Western, 
in support of its Motion For Summary Judgment 
offered in evidence the insurance contract (Ex. 
D-1) , the transcript of the proceedings for a con-
tinuance of the trial in the prior case (Ex. D-2), 
the letters sent to Lew and the letter received from 
Lew (Exs. D 3-8), the depositions of Marie E. 
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Peterson and Dennis McMillan ( Exs. D 10-11) and 
the file of the prior action against Chuck Shim Lew. 
In support of her Motion For Summary Judg-
ment, the plaintiff offered no evidence or affidavits, 
but stood upon the pleadings. 
On December 9, 1965 the court granted the 
plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment as to 
the first cause of action and dismissed the second 
cause of action. In its Memorandum Decision the 
court stated ( R. 52) : 
"In so finding the Court is of the opinion 
that this is even a more flagrant case of using 
a reasonable effort by the insurance company 
than that found in 5 Utah 2d. at Page 15. It 
appears that the defendant has agents in 
various parts of the country who were able 
at least to determine the addresses of the 
insured, and they apparently left the matter 
of attempting to find the insured entirely to 
the Utah attorneys, which does not appear, to 
this Court, to be a reasonable effort." 
The court did not enumerate the reasons for 
its decision dismissing the second cause of action, 
the action praying for $2,500.00 because of the al-
leged bad faith of the defendant, Western. We as-
sume it. was in response to the Motion of counsel 
for defendant made at the time of the pre-trial in 
the fallowing words : 
" ... I include in this motion all the 
grounds stated in the motion for summary 
judgment, and now as a basis for the grounds 
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stated in the motion fo1· summary judgment 
the stipulations, the exhibits and the deposi-
tions and the record of the prior case. In 
addition thereto I move specifically for a dis-
missal of the second cause of action, asking 
for a judgment in excess of policy limits of 
$2,500.00, on the grounds that the Utah Su-
preme Court has specifically held in one case 
that a motion to recover an excess over the 
insurance policy cannot be joined with a gar-
nishment action against the insurance com-
pany to recover the amount of a judgment 
recovered against the insured." (R. 49) 
The case which counsel had in mind was Paul v. 
Kirkendall, 6 Utah (2d) 256, 311 Pac. (2d) 376, 
in which it was held that a judgment debtor's tort 
claim against the garnishee cannot be adjudicated 
in garnishment proceedings brought by the judg-
ment holder. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENSE OF 
NON-COOPERATION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AND 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED THERE-
FORE TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The paramount issue in this case is whether 
the record supports the actions of the trial court 
in denying defendant's Motion For Summary Judg-
ment and in granting plaintiff's Motion. It is the 
appellant's contention here that the facts within 
the record clearly shows: The insured acted wil-
fully and unreasonably in secreting himself by not 
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providing forwarding adch·esses and other essential 
information which the insurer had requested from 
him in order that he could be contacted for assist-
ance in the preparation and trial of the action; 
that the insurer, Western, was diligent in its search 
for Lew; and that the absence of the insured, he 
being the sole witness capable of establishing the 
defendant's affirmative defense, was prirna facie 
prejudicial to the insurer in its defense of the action 
against the insured. 
This court has on two prior occasions dealt 
with non-cooperation cases. However, the situations 
in those two cases are readily distinguished from 
the present case. 
In Oberhansley v. Traveler's Insitrance C01n-
pany, 5 Utah (2d) 15, 295 Pac. (2d) 1093 (1956) 
the court affirmed a trial court's verdict for the 
plaintiff. The basis for the court's decision was the 
fact that the insured had not hidden himself from 
the insurer, but had notified the insured well in 
advance of the trial that he would not attend due 
to the danger of losing his newly acquired employ-
ment and a prospective promotion. The issue there 
was resolved in favor of the plaintiff on the ground 
that the insurer knew where the insured was, knew 
he was not corning to the trial and failed to pre-
serve his testimony by taking his deposition. The 
court there was not concerned with the reasonable-
ness of the insurer's efforts to find the insured, 
since the whereabouts of the insured was known. 
10 
Instead, the court held that the insured had a justi-
fiable excuse for not attending the trial, and that 
the insurance company could rrot claim to have been 
prejudiced by his absence since the company failed 
to take reasonable efforts to preserve his testimony 
after learning that he would not be at the trial. The 
issue in the present case is whether the defendant 
made diligent efforts to locate the insured - an 
issue not before the court in Oberhansley v. Trav-
eler's, supra. 
In the recent case of Montgo11iery v. Preferred 
Risk Mutual Insurance C01npany, Docket No. 10,278, 
the court was once again faced with the question of 
whether the insurer could establish prejudice by the 
insured's non-attendance at the trial. The court 
held that the insurer could have used the deposition 
taken previously by the plaintiff and that insurer 
was, therefore, not prejudiced in the defense. The 
court also said that had the insured's presence been 
necessary the insurer did not act diligently in locat-
ing him, as indicated by the fact that the first letter 
ti-acing the deposition (which had never been re-
turned by the insured) was mailed five years after 
the accident. The court also noted that the insured 
had a criminal charge pending against him, was un-
employed and had recently been divorced, all of 
which should have put insurer on notice that the 
insured might not be present at the trial. However, 
the apparent concern of the court was over the 
failure to get the deposition of the insured while 
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he was still available - and not whether the search 
for him after he became unavailable was sufficient 
The facts of that case present a situation where the 
insurer failed on all three requirements of the de-
fense, i.e. to show that it was prejudiced by the non-
attendance, that it had acted diligently to over-
come the prejudice and that it had made a diligent 
effort to locate the insured. 
The case at bar presents only one of these three 
issues - whether diligent efforts to find the in-
sured were made by the insurer. This was pointed 
out by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision 
in which it concludes that the insurer was not reas-
onably diligent in its efforts to locate the insured. 
The trial court apparently did not take issue with 
the fact that the non-attendance of the insured 
worked a prejudice to the insurer's case and that 
the failure of the insurer to take the insured's 
deposition was reasonable up until the time it was 
informed by the return of the February 7, 1964 
letter that Lew had moved without leaving a for-
warding address and without notifying Western 
as he had agreed to do. 
There can be no serious dispute as to the pre-
judicial effect of Lew's absence at the trial. He was 
the only one who could testify in support of the 
affirmative defense. The deposition of Dennis Mc-
Millan indicates that Lew's testimony in the cita-
tion hearing was that McMillan had run the reel 
light and that Lew had the green light. It is obvious 
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that the issue of liability in that case hinged upon 
the sole question of who had the right of way in 
the intersection at the time of the accident, to which 
issue Lew's testimony was essential. His disappear-
ance left Western without a defendant and without 
a defense. 
There also is no serious dispute as to whether 
Western acted reasonably up to the time that notice 
was received of Lew's disappearance. The letter 
which Western received from Lew on September 19, 
1963 is self evidence of the assurance given by Lew 
that he would be available for trial. Had he stated 
that he could not attend the trial here in Utah or 
had he in some other manner cast doubt upon his 
attendance the situation here would be different, 
thus similar to the Oberhansley situation. But, in-
stead, he indicated interest in the case and the tenor 
of his letter pledges cooperation in the disposition 
of the action. 
It should not be forgotten that the primary duty 
in such situation is on the insured, for he is under 
a contractual duty to make himself available for the 
trial. In the Oberhansley case the court recognized 
that an unreasonable failure by the witness- insured, 
if material, to attend the trial is a breach of the 
cooperation clause of the liability policy. Thus, in 
any consideration of whether the non-cooperation 
defense has been established the essential factor is 
whether there is any evidence indicating that the 
insurd's failure to attend was excused or justifiable. 
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There was such evidence in the Obalwnsley case, 
but none in the present case. 
In many states the absence from trial is all 
that is required to sustain the non-cooperation de-
fense. See 60 A.L.R. (2d) 1050. It is apparent, how-
ever, that in Utah to enforce that duty the insurer 
must also act reasonably in obtaining the insured's 
cooperation - but that is not to say that the in-
surer need go to the expense of getting depositions 
from its insureds who are informed of their duty 
and who express willingness to perform it. It would 
be grossly unfair and contrary to the parties own 
contract to impress upon the insurer the duty to 
act as a nursemaid to its insureds who from all 
appearances are willing to cooperate in the defense 
and appear at the trial. It was the recognition of 
this rule by the trial court in the original case which 
made it necessary for Western to withdraw from 
the defense of that action. Wes tern moved for a 
continuance when it learned that Lew had left Bien-
fait, Canada without leaving a forwarding address, 
so that it might continue its efforts to locate Lew 
in Florida. The court denied the Motion, and in 
doing so made the following observation: 
'"Well, I will show that by saying that 
when a witness is playing hard to get and 
trying to hide from you, I am more inclined 
to help you find him; but where a party hin:-
self gives the runaround to counsel that this 
defendant has seemed to give, I don't feel 
quite so sympathetic towards him. I think he 
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owes a duty to the court to he ready when 
the court is ready for trial, and I believe he's 
had. ample notice and ample opportunity to 
be found if he wanted to be found, so the 
motion will be denied.'' (Ex. D-2, p. 5) 
It is clearly indisputable that the defendant 
did all that could be reasonably expected up to the 
time of notice that Lew had left his California 
address. It is further the contention of the defendant 
that as a matter of law Wes tern acted with reason-
able diligence in trying to locate the insured from 
February 4th until the time of withdrawal on March 
7th. This is not a situation as in the Montgomery 
case, where there was a three year period of dis-
appearance and only feeble if not non-existent at-
tempts to locate the insured by a letter seeking to 
get the deposition back. In the present case Western 
had notice on February 7, 1964 that the insured 
had left California without giving forwarding in-
formation to the insurer. During the next month 
registered letters were sent to all known addresses 
and information was sought from other sources such 
as the agent who sold the insurance policy. He re-
ported a personal investigation in California which 
showed that Lew had left California for Canada 
or Washington. He had also received correspondence 
from Lew at the Bienfait, Saskatchewan address, 
but when he telephoned the address he was told that 
Lew was probably somewhere in Florida. Upon 
receipt of this information Western moved for a 
continuance in .order to make an investigation in 
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Florida, but the motion was denied. Western had 
less than a month to locate Lew, who was "prob-
ably in Florida somewhere". Within that short 
period Wes tern did all that could be reasonably ex-
pected under the circumstances. 
It is unrealistic, if not impossible, to set up a 
pervasive rule as to what efforts should be taken 
by an insurance company in all situations of lost 
insureds. There are several things an insurance 
company could possibly do to locate the insured, 
given time, but the law only requires reasonable 
diligence under the particular circumstances. If this 
were not so the cooperation clause of the policy would 
be nullified and the insurer would often find itself 
defending cases without the essential testimony of 
the insured, as in the present case. The insurance 
contract involved here makes compliance with the 
cooperation clause a condition precedent to coverage, 
not merely a covenant to cooperate. 
"Conditions 
"4. ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION 
OF THE INSURED - COVERAGES A, B, 
D, E, F, G, H, I, J AND K: The insured shall 
cooperate with The Western and, upon The 
· Western's request, attend hearings and trials 
and assist in making settlements, securing 
and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance 
of witnesses and in the conduct of any legal 
proceedings in connection with the subject 
matter of this insurance. The insured shall 
not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make 
any payment, assume any obligation or in-
lG 
cur any expense other than for such first aid 
to others as shall be imperative at the time of 
accident. 
"8. ACTION AGAINST THE WESTERN 
-COVERAGES A, B, C AND K: No action 
shall lie against The Western unless as a con-
dition precedent thereto, the insJred shall 
have fully complied with all the terms of this 
1. " po icy ... 
Thus, once the insurer establishes that the insured 
did not attend the trial, that his absence was pre-
judicial to insurer's defense and that a reasonable 
effort had been made to locate him such defense 
demands as a matter of law that the insurer be 
relieved of liability under the policy. 
There are numerous cases which hold that ef-
forts similar to those made in the present situation 
are as a matter of law reasonably diligent efforts. 
In Pawlik v. State Farm, Mutual Autonwbile 
Insurance Co., 302 Fed. (2d) 255 (CA 7th 1962) 
the trial court found as a matter of law that the 
defendant insurer had shown a breach of the cooper-
ation clause. There the accident occurred in Nov-
ember, 1956. The insured went to Virginia to live, 
but he informed the insurer that he would return 
If needed. In September of 1957 suit was filed on 
the accident. On August 20, 1958 the insured re-
ceived a letter giving notice to him that the trial 
was set for October 20, 1958. A second letter was 
received by him on October 2, 1958 advising him 
to attend. He did not appear and the insurer with-
17 
drew. The court sustained the trial court's find-
ing as a matter of law that the affirmative defense 
had been established and that the plaintiff had not 
fulfilled its burden of refuting the defense. 
A case very similar to the present situation 
is Rohlf v. Great Anierican Mutual lndeinnity Co., 
161 N.E. 232, 27 Ohio App. 208 (1927). The acci-
dent occurred on August 6, 1922. Suit was brought 
19 months later. The insurer attempted to find the 
insured in four different cities, and finally found 
him in Toledo on February 4, 1925. The insured 
at that time made a written statement in which he 
denied any negligence, and put the blame on the 
driver of plaintiff's car for driving on the wrong 
side of the road. On February 16, 1925 a letter was 
sent to the insured at the Toledo address, advising 
him to appear at the trial. He made no response 
to the letter and did not attend the trial. The court 
affirmed the trial court's finding that the defense 
of non-cooperation had been established. In doing 
so the court put great weight on the fact that the 
insured had told the insurer that he would keep it 
advised of any change of address, "but that he had 
not given the company any notice of his change of 
addre~s and receipt for the registered letters had 
been returned to the company, signed by his repre-
sentatives at the Toledo address". 
In Cooper v. Employers Mutual Liability In-
surance C01npany of Wisconsin, 103 S.E. (2d) 210, 
199 Va. 908 (1958) the accident was reported in 
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July, 1955. The insured gave an address where he 
could be located. A week later he gave a written 
statement to the insurer, with the same address 
indicated. The Complaint was served on the insured 
at his address on August 12, 1955. Shortly there-
after the insurer tried to locate the insured at the 
address but learned that he had quit his job and 
had moved. His employer gave his last known ad-
dress as being Alberta, Virginia. On October 31, 
1955 the insurer wrote to the insured, reminding 
him of his duty to cooperate, which letter was sent 
"return receipt requested" to his last three known 
addresses. No response was received. On November 
14, 1955 the insurer denied coverage but remained 
in the suit under a Reservation Of Rights, notice 
of which was mailed to the above addresses. On 
November 30, 1955 a letter was mailed to the in-
sured again advising him of his duties and of the 
coming trial date. The letter was returned, un-
answered. Upon the trial a judgment was recovered 
by the plaintiff. In the subsequent garnishment suit 
the trial court struck all of the plaintiff's evidence 
at the conclusion of his case. The court affirmed 
it, holding that as a matter of law the efforts of the 
insurer in sending letters to all known addresses of 
the insured and contacting his former employer 
were all a reasonably prudent person could be ex-
pected to do. The court said: 
" ... When he moved from 3730 Delmont 
Street, the address given in his accident re-
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port, to 2811 Hanes Avenue he did not notify 
the company of his change of address and 
left no forwarding address. Likewise when he 
moved from Hanes Avenue to Alberta he fail-
ed to notify the company and left no forward-
ing address. The latter address was secured 
from his former employer. One of the two 
letters delivered to that address, signed for 
by Wynn, was not returned, but the other 
was returned unopened. Whether Trayham 
actually received the letter not returned is 
not shown by the record. He failed to contact 
the company at any time after he made his 
report of the accident on July 12, 1955. He 
did not assist in any manner in the prepara-
tion for trial nor did he appear at the trial. 
These facts and circumstances constituted a 
wilful lack of cooperation with the company 
and such lack of cooperation was substantial 
and material and was prejudicial to def end-
an t ... especially in view of the fact that his 
report of the accident filed with the company 
indicated a defense to the action." (Page 
215) 
And in Eakle v. Hayes, 55 Pac. (2d) 1072 
(Wash. 1936) the accident occurred on February 
5, 1932. The suit was filed in December, 1932 and 
in November of 1933 the trial date was set for 
March 27, 1934. The insurer tried to locate the in- 1 
sured at his residence in Seattle but its efforts 
failed. Relatives didn't know where he was either. 
The insurer sent letters to all known addresses, 
which letters were all returned. The insurer then 
learned that the insured had left Seattle and had 
gone east. Through another source of information 
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it was learned that the insured had been seen in 
Charleston, Mass. on February 7, 1934, but efforts 
to trace him from there were unsuccessful. In re-
ference to the efforts to find the insured by mail-
ing letters to all known addresses, the court said 
on page 1074 
" . . . there was nothing more that re-
spondent could have done under the circum-
stances ... " 
In Grady v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insur-
ance Company, 264 Fed. (2d) 519 (CA 4th 1959) 
the accident occurred on July 19, 1955 and the in-
sured subsequently forwarded the suit papers to 
the insurer. At that time the insurer notified the 
insured to advise its attorneys of any change of 
address. On October 20, 1955 a letter was mailed 
to the insured at his previous address, but the letter 
was returned undelivered. The insurer then made 
inquiry at the address and at the insured's previous 
place of employment, learning only that the in-
sured had left with no forwarding address given. 
On October 28, 1955 the insurer, having learned 
that the insured might have moved to El Centro, 
California, wrote a letter to that address, request-
ing the insured to make immediate contact with the 
insurer. No answer was received. Again on Nov-
ember 8, 1955 the insurer wrote a letter, with copies 
going to the El Centro address, the Virginia address 
and to the insured's previous employer in Virginia. 
No response was ever received. The insurer then 
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withdrew from the case. The coul't affirmed the 
trial court's dismissal of the complaint against the 
insurer on the ground that there was no genuine 
issue as to whether the non-cooperation defense had 
been established. 
In Polito v. Galluzzo, 149 N.E. (2d) 375, Mass. 
(1958) the accident occurred on May 1, 1953. A 
statement was taken from the insured on July 6, 
1953 and the suit was filed September 30, 1953. On 
October 5, 1955 a registered letter was mailed to the 
insured advising him of the coming trial. The letter 
was returned, undelivered. An investigator who went 
to the address could not find him either. A con-
stable with a subpoena also could not find him. In 
the garnishment action the trial court dismissed the 
complaint. In affirming the trial court, the court 
made this observation which she<ls light on the 
present case: 
"The claim here is that the disappear-
ance of the insured without notifying the in-
surer of his new add1·ess or furnishing some 
method by which he could be reached, consti-
tutes a lack of cooperation and justifies the 
insurer in disclaiming liability after it has 
failed by reasonable methods to secure the 
attendance of the insured as a witness at the 
trial. So far as appears the insurer had no 
other available witness on the question of 
liability. The last communication the company 
had from Galluzzo was in July, 1959. So far 
as the insurance conipany ioas concerned he 
virtually disappeared. Here the company had 
made reasonable efforts to locate him. We 
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think that the disappearance of the insured 
and his failure to notify the insurer of the 
change of address were a material breach 
of the cooperation clause in the policy and 
warranted a disclaimer." (Page 377) 
And in Pot01nac Insurance Company v. Stan-
ley, 281 Fed. (2d) 775 (CA 7th 1960) the insurer 
brought a declaratory judgment action for a deter-
mination of its non-cooperation defense. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment to the in-
surer. The accident occurred in March of 1957. The 
affidavits of the insurer indicated that a series of 
nine letters, beginning in September, 1957, were 
mailed to the insured and copies to members of his 
family. He moved several times and each time failed 
to notify the insurer of his address. The insurer 
enlisted the services of a credit agency, which failed 
to locate him. The court affirmed the summary 
judgment, holding that it was not debatable that 
the insurer had shown due diligence. 
And in Indeninity Insurance Company of North 
Arnerica v. Smith, 78 A. (2d) 461, Md. (1951) the 
insureds knew of the necessity of their presence at 
the trial. One week before trial the insurer at-
tempted to contact them and learned they had moved 
without leaving a new address. A continuance was 
granted and registered letters were sent to all known 
addresses, but to no avail. Subpoenaes were also 
issued, but returned unserved. Inquiry was made of 
the insureds' relatives and neighbors. In the trial 
court the verdict was in favor of the plaintiff, but 
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the appellate court reversed and granted a directed 
verdict to the insurer on the ground that as a matter 
of law the insureds had breached the policy and 
the insurer had made reasonable efforts to locate 
them. 
The point of the above cases is that the efforts 
to be made by the insurer depend upon the time 
available and the information available to the in-
surer about the insured's whereabouts. The appel-
lant is unable to see how the efforts taken by it 
and its counsel after learning of Lew's disappear-
ance are anything but a reasonable effort. Just 
as in some of the above cited cases, the defendant 
Western did not even know for sure what state 
or city the insured was in. Therefore, in absence of 
such information the insurer's only method short 
of a full scale national search was to send out 
letters to known addresses of Lew's residences and 
employment in hopes of obtaining information as 
to his new address. It would appear to be a miscon-
ception of the relationship between the insurer and 
the insured to hold that the insured, with full knowl-
edge of his duty to cooperate, could wilfully secrete 
himself by moving around from state to state and 
from country to country and yet still demand cover-
age beGause the insurance company did not employ 
every conceivable means of locating him regardless 
of the expense and time involved. The insured not 
only made such moves but also did it with full 
knowledge that he had promised to keep the insur-
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ance company advised of his whereabouts and he 
obviously knew that the insurance company was 
relying upon that promise. 
This obviously is not a case where the insurer 
was encouraging the insured to "stay lost" so that 
the former could withdraw. The insurer, with Lew's 
cooperation, had a defense to the original action. 
The record shows that the usual pre-trial proce-
dures were fallowed by Western in preparing the 
defense, and that depositions of the plaintiff and 
and Dennis McMillan were taken. And in addi-
tion, Western made a good faith offer of settle-
ment even after it knew of Lew's disappearance. 
The judge of the trial court in the first action was 
of the opinion that the i'nsured was giving the in-
surer the "runaround" and, therefore, he (the in-
sured) would get no sympathy from the court. 
Consequently the insurer was caught in the middle 
of the proverbial "squeeze play" - the continuance 
was not granted since the court was of the opinion 
that the insured had breached its contract, but in the 
subsequent action the insurer is held liable because 
it did not make sufficient efforts to find the in-
sured, seemingly without any regard by that court 
to the lack of opportunity caused by the denial of 
the continuance. 
Appellant believes it is clear that the trial 
court erred in not granting defendant's Motion For 
Summary Judgment; that the evidence submitted, 
all by the defendant, establishes without any genu-
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ine issue of material fact the defense of non-cooper-
ation; and since no evidence of excuse or justifica-
tion was offered by the plaintiff a summary judg-
ment for the defendant was necessary. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF EVIDENCE NOT IN 
THE RECORD, WHICH EVIDENCE IS NOT AMEN-
ABLE TO JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
The Memorandum Decision makes it clear that 
the trial court below, in granting the summary 
judgment for the plaintiff, took judicial notice of 
the fact that Western "has agents in various parts 
of the country who were able at least to determine 
the addresses of the insured". The court gives no 
other reason for holding that the defendant's ef-
forts were not reasonable. What the court in effect 
did was make an assumption of fact not warranted 
by the record. There is no evidence in this record 
where Western may or may not have agents, and 
particularly not in the State of Florida. Such evi-
dence, if it existed, should have been presented by 
the plain tiff to show that the efforts were not 
reasonable. But there was no such evidence pre-
sented at any stage of either proceeding. 
It ·is a cardinal principle accepted without dis-
pute that a court may take judicial notice only of 
facts which are matters of common knowledge, 
which are well and authoritatively settled and not 
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doubtful or uncertain and which must be known to 
be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court, 
20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 17. It is obvious 
that the particular whereabouts of defendant's 
agents, assumed in this case by the court, are not 
of such a class of facts as is amenable to judicial 
notice. If this method of fact finding were permis-
sible the courts would be granting summary judg-
ments based upon their own assumptions of the 
facts, thus depriving the parties of the effect of 
evidence they have submitted and depriving them 
of a fair determination of the issues based only 
on the record presented. See an analagous situation 
in JV!almberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975. 
It is obvious that the court erred in assuming 
such critical facts, and that such error calls for a 
reversal of the summary judgment granted to the 
plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF 
INTEREST AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AND AP-
PELLANT. 
There is yet another matter in which the court 
erred in this action, and that is in its assessment 
of interest on the Judgment which the court gave 
to the plaintiff on her first cause of action. Of 
course, if this court agrees with the defendant and 
appellant that the trial court erred in granting 
plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment or in 
failing to grant the defendant's Motion For Sum-
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mary Judgment this point becomes moot. It is only 
applicable should this court decide that the trial 
court did not err in granting plaintiff's Motion For 
Summary Judgment. 
By the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, plain-
tiff in her first cause of action prays judgment "'on 
the first cause of action against defendant for the 
sum of $10,000.00, interest from the date of said 
judgment at the rate of 8 % per annum, costs of 
that action and costs of this action" ( R. 4). There 
were no amendments to this prayer, yet the court 
in its Judgment entered herein (R. 53) purported 
to give the plaintiff interest on the Judgment in 
the Marie E. Peterson v. Chuck Shim Lew case, 
or interest on $12,500.00, rather than on $10,000.00, 
the amount of interest awarded being $1,880.00. 
This would appear to be error in a number of re-
spects. 
First of all, even if we consider the amount to 
be $12,500.00, the interest has been incorrectly 
computed. 
Secondly, the award of interest would appear 
to be beyond the prayer of the Amended Complaint 
since the plaintiff simply prays for judgment on 
the fitst cause of action against the defendant for 
$10,000.00 and for interest on her $10,000.00 Judg-
ment at the rate of eight percent per annum. We 
submit this is a fair construction of the plaintiff's 
prayer and if submitted and if the Judgment of 
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the trial court is otherwise affirmed would mean 
that the plaintiff would be entitled to a Judgment 
of $10,000.00 plus interest on said sum at the rate 
of eight percent per annum from the date of entry 
thereof, which in this instance is December 13, 
1965. Were we to assume that the prayer of plain-
tiff's Amended Complaint as set out above referred 
to the Judgment in the Peterson v. Lew case (which 
it does not) rather than to the Judgment in this 
case and that the defendant and appellant Western 
had a duty upon the rendition of the Judgment in 
the Peterson v. Lew case to pay its policy limits 
on said Judgment for the reason that its insured, 
Chuck Shim Lew, was not guilty of violation of the 
cooperative clause of his policy, assessment of in-
terest on the $12,500.00 figure would appear to be 
error. Under such a view the most that can be said 
is that Western would be liable for interest on that 
portion of the Judgment which it should have paid, 
or for interest on $10,000.00. 
It should be kept in mind that this is not a 
case where the insurer has appealed or otherwise 
prevented execution or collection of a judgment 
for its own purposes while it sought a reversal of 
the Judgment entered against its insured. In an 
action brought by its own insured against the in-
surer, upon a determination of the issues against 
the insurer, the insured would at the most only have 
been entitled to collect damages to the extent that 
he was damaged by the insurer's breach of contract, 
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which would include the amount the insurer should 
have paid plus interest on said amount. The policy 
of the defendant and appellant contains what is 
termed the ·"Standard Interest Clause" (see Ex. 
D-1) which reads as follows: 
"II. SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS: 
... The Western agrees to pay, in addition 
to the applicable limits of liability: 
" (a) all expenses incurred by The Wes tern, 
all costs taxed against the insured in any 
such suit and all interest on the entire amount 
of any judgment therein which accrues after 
entry of the judgment and before The West-
ern has paid or tendered or deposited in court 
that part of the judgment which does not 
exceed the limit of The Western's liability 
thereon·" 
' 
It would be an inequitable result to put the 
burden upon the insurer to pay interest accruing 
on the debt of the insured. The courts have recog-
nized the inconsistency of holding the insurer liable 
for interest on money which the insured is oblig-
ated to pay but has not paid, and thus subject to 
his beneficial use. In the landmark case of Smnpson 
v. Century Inde11inity Co., 8 Cal. (2d) 476, 66 P. 
(2d) 434 (1937) the verdict was greatly in excess, 
and an appeal was taken from that verdict and 
was affirmed. The policy contained the standard 
interest clause. The question there explored is the 
same as is presented here, what is meant by the 
words "all interest accrumg after entry of judg-
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ment"? The court said the meaning of the words 
is shown by two considerations: 
1. Reading the words in context with the 
rest of the policy clearly indicates that the 
interest is limited, as is the liability. The court 
said 
"It hardly seems probable, therefore, that the 
parties to the policy of insurance, after ex-
pressly limiting the liability of the company 
to the principal sum of $10,000, intended to 
make it liable for interest on any greater 
amount .... " (Page 436) 
2. Since the insured could lose nothing 
by the appeal period, there clearly was no in-
tent to compensate him for loss not suffered. 
The court argued that the insured had the use 
of the money during the appeal period. There-
fore, since interest is merely the value set for 
the use of money, the insured lost nothing. The 
court referred to a previous case of Maryland 
Casualty Co. v. Omaha Electric L. & P. Co., 
157 F. 514, 519 ( CCA 8th 1907), where the 
court said it was a specious argument to say 
that the appeal by the insurer injured the in-
sured. The court said : 
"The assured stood after paying the interest 
exactly as it would have stood if it had paid 
the judgment of $5,000 on Jan. 3, 1902, when 
originally rendered. Nothing was lost by the 
appeal as the interest ultimately paid was 
neutralized by the use and enjoyment of the 
money before that time." 
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In the Sampson case the coul't thus held that 
the words "all interest" meant all the interest ac-
cruing on the judgment only up to the policy limits. 
And in a more recent case a third reason for 
not holding the insurer liable was espoused. In 
Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Winget, 197 
F. (2d) 97 (CCA 9th, Cal. 1952) the standard in-
terest clause was again involved. The court said 
"If we hold an insurer liable for interest, not 
on the portion of the judgment for which it 
is liable, which it does not pay, but on the 
whole amount recovered against the insured, 
we are imposing vicarious liability ... And 
a contract should not be interpreted in such 
a manner as to impose upon a person respon-
sibility for the obligation of others, even if it 
be in the form of interest only." (Page 107) 
The court then quoted from Malnigren v. South-
western Auto Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App. 135, 14 P. (2d) 
351,352 (1932) 
"The only logical construction to place upon 
the word interest as used in the above men-
tioned policy, is that it referred only to in-
terest accruing on the principal sum of a 
judgment for which respondent (insurer) 
was liable under the terms of the policy ... " 
(Page 107) 
The court compared the Mal1ngren rule and the 
theory of the insured. 
"'This interpretation commends itself to reas-
on. The interpretation which the trial court 
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rejected would penalize the insurance com-
pany for exercising the right, or encourag-
ing the insured, to appeal." (Page 107) 
There have been numerous cases since the 
Sampson case which have held that the Standard 
Interest Clause limits liability on interest just as 
the total liability is limited. In Morgan v. Graham, 
228 F. (2d) 625 (CA 10 Okla. 1956) the court 
followed the Sampson and Standard Accident cases 
in holding "all interest" as meaning only the interest 
on the policy limit. The Morgan case was followed by 
two later cases: Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Indem-
nity Insurance Co., 260 F. (2d) 361 (CA 10 Colo. 
1958); and Herzog v. Fidelity And Casualty Co., 
257 F. (2d) 840(CA10 Okla. 1958). 
The New York rule is clearly that of limited 
liability for interest. It was first espoused in Devlin 
v. New York Mutual Casualty Taxicab Insurance 
Asso., 213 App. Div. 152, 210 N.Y.S. 57 (1925). 
And in Home Indemnity Co. v. Corie, 206 Misc. 720, 
134 N.Y.S. (2d) 443, 446 (1954) the court said: 
"When the nature of interest, compensation 
for the use or detention of money is born in 
mind, the result reached is far more reason-
able than that sought by the defendants (the 
insured). Since the limit of the plaintiff:s 
liability on the judgments themselves is 
$10 000, this is the sum of money for whose 
use 'it should pay ... The insured's surrender 
of control of the action, incidental to the in-
surance, does not justify the impositi~n of 
liability for interest on the part of the Judg-
ment which it is in no event bound to pay ... " 
33 
The H01ne lndeninity case was then followed in 
United States Fidelity And Guaranty Co. v. Hol-
kins, 8 Misc. (2d) 296, 170 N.Y.S. (2d) 441 ( 1957). 
And two other recent cases have followed the rule: 
Crook v. State Farrn Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 235 
S.C. 452, 112 S.E. (2d) 241 (1960); and Carlile 
v. Vari, 113 Ohio 233, 177 N.E. (2d) 694 (1961). 
In the Carlile case the court said it was following 
the majority position. 
The defendant, therefore, contends that the 
better rule, and the one fallowed by most courts, 
is that the insurer is not liable for any interest 
other than that which accrues on the judgment for 
which it is liable. The various cases cited have inter-
preted the Standard Interest Clause as being clear 
and unambiguous, and have found no detriment 
to the insured. 
CONCLUSION 
A reasonable and fair consideration of the 
facts as presented to the trial court at the pre-trial 
in support of defendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment leads to the conclusion that the defend-
ant and appellant established its defense of non-
cooperation by a greater preponderance of the evi-
dence. The facts clearly show that the defendant 
was greatly prejudiced in its defense by Chuck 
Shim Lew's absence and that the defendant and 
appellant had made reasonably diligent efforts with-
in the time allowed by the trial court in the Marie 
E. Peterson v. Chuck Shim Lew case, once it was 
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known that the insured had left California without 
notifying Wes tern as he had been advised he should 
do, to locate the insured. The defendant's efforts 
did not stop even here. It sought additional time 
from the trial court in the action brought by Marie 
E. Peterson against Chuck Shim Lew to gain addi-
tional time in which to locate Chuck Shim Lew, but 
the trial court denied it this additional time - in 
effect finding that Chuck Shim Lew had failed to 
perform his obligation to keep counsel for Western 
and the court informed as to his whereabouts and 
had failed to cooperate either with counsel or court 
in making himself available for trial. 
Even so, the defendant and appellant did not 
seek to take any advantage of Chuck Shim Lew's 
absence but offered to allow judgment to be taken 
for its evaluation of the case in the amount of 
$6,000.00 even after the court had refused it a 
continuance - again evidencing its efforts to act 
in good faith both with reference to its own insur-
ed and to those who might have claims against its 
insured. 
In view of the foregoing the trial court in this 
case would appear to have had no alternative but 
to grant the defendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment in the absence of any evidence by the 
plaintiff that Chuck Shim Lew's non attendance 
was excusable and without prejudice or that West-
ern's efforts to locate him were not reasonable. The 
plaintiff presented no such evidence whatsoever. 
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I 
The trial court erred in yet another respect \ ' . 
in assuming the existence of facts not shown, to- ' 
wit, that Western had agents located throughout 
the country who could in fact have located the in-
sured, Chuck Shim Lew, within the time available 
to the defendant and appellant. It is true that under 
its contract of insurance the insurer, Western, had 
a duty to its insured, Chuck Shim Lew, but by 
the same instrument he agreed 
"The insured shall cooperate with The West-
ern and, upon The Western's request, attend 
hearings and trials and assist in making 
settlements, securing and giving evidence, ob- ' 
taining the attendance of witnesses and in the 
conduct of any legal proceedings in connec-
tion with the subject matter of this insurance. 
The insured shall not, except at his own cost, 
voluntarily make any payment, assume any 
obligation or incur any expense other than 
for such first aid to others as shall be imper-
ative at the time of accident." 
We should not lose sight of the fact that an 
insurance policy is in essence a contract between 
the insurer and its insured and that judgment 1 
creditors, such as the plaintiff in this case, claim 
through the insured and should have no greater 
rights under the policy than the insured, himself. 
There appears to be no escape from the con-
clusion in this case that the insured, Chuck Shim 
Lew, failed to comply with his obligation under 
the policy and that the defendant and appellant 
did everything which it might be reasonably ex-
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pected to do to secure his compliance and coopera-
tion. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the 
trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant 
and appellant's Motion For Summary Judgment 
and in granting such a Motion to the plaintiff; and 
respectfully petition this court to reverse the trial 
court, vacate the summary judgment and enter a 
summary judgment in the defendant's favor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Appellant 
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